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INTRODUCTION

A Capsulized Version of Provisions of Public Law 86-272

In 1959, in response to pressure from multistate business and
over the protest of state tax authorities and others, Congress passed
Public Law 86-272 limiting the power of state and local governments
to tax net income derived from interstate commerce.' The provisions
*

Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law. B.A., Maryville College, 1936;
LL.B., University of Virginia, 1939; LL.M., 1949; J.S.D., Columbia University, 1952. The
author wishes to express his appreciation for the valuable research done by John S. Bryant,
J.D., Vanderbilt University School of Law, while a student at Vanderbilt. See Note, Public
Law 86-272: Legislative Ambiguities and JudicialDifficulties, 27 VAND. L. REV. 313 (1974).
1. Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, §§ 101-202, 73 Stat. 555, as amended, 15
U.S.C. §§ 381-84 (1970). The full text of 15 U.S.C. §§ 381-84 is set forth in the Appendix to
this article infra. For a comprehensive, perceptive, and useful analysis of Public Law 86-272,
coupled with constitutional ramifications surrounding state taxation, see BEAMAN, PAYING
TAXES TO OTHER STATES, ch. 6, Minimum Nexus for Direct Net Income Taxes (1963).
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of Public Law 86-272, briefly stated, prohibit state or local governments from imposing net income taxes on sellers of tangible personal property whose business activities in the state are limited to
one or more of the following:
1. solicitation of orders for sales of tangible personal property
by the seller or his own representative when the orders are sent
outside the taxing state for approval or rejection and are filled
2
by shipment or delivery from a point outside that state;
2. solicitation of orders for the sale of tangible personal property by the seller or his own representative for the benefit of a
prospective customer of the business, which orders are sent out
of the state for acceptance, and are filled from a point outside
3
the taxing state;
3. sales or solicitation by "independent contractors" who represent more than one principal and who hold themselves out as
"independent contractors" in the regular course of their busi4
ness.
In contrast to the permitted activities of the taxpayer itself, the
independent contractor may complete a sale and maintain an office
within the taxing state without subjecting the out-of-state seller to
tax liability, so long as the independent contractor's activities on
behalf of the taxpayer consist solely of making sales or soliciting
orders for sales of tangible personal property.5 Judicial application
of the "independent contractor" exemption, however, will not be
analyzed in this article.
It is the scope of the first two escape hatches-the breadth of
the "solicitation" and "delivery" exemption-upon which this article will focus. More particularly, the following discussion will delve
into the apprehensions of multistate business that led to the enactment of Public Law 86-272, the conflicting views regarding the wisdom of this federal statute, the interpretative difficulties resulting
from Congress' failure to define "solicitations," and the possible
avenues of relief for these problems.
B.

Origin, Nature, and Scope of the Problem

The forces that galvanized Congress into action, leading to the
passage of Public Law 86-272, were a triumvirate of decisions of the
2.
3.
4.
5.

15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1) (1970).
Id. § 381(a)(2).
Id. §§ 381(c), (d)(1).
Id. § 381(c).
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United States Supreme Court in 1959. The cases were Northwestern
States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,' Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue,7 and InternationalShoe Co. v.
Fontenot."
Perhaps most significant was the Northwestern States decision.? At issue was the constitutionality of state net income tax laws
which levied taxes on that portion of a foreign corporation's net
income earned from and fairly apportioned to business activities
within the taxing state when those activities are exclusively in furtherance of interstate commerce. No question was raised by the
taxpayer as to the reasonableness of the apportionment of net income under the taxing state's formulas. Over both commerce and
due process clause objections, the Supreme Court sustained the
levies by a vote of six to three. Taxpayer in Northwestern States was
an Iowa corporation with its home office and manufacturing plant
in Iowa. Taxpayer's only connection with the taxing state (Minnesota) was that it employed four salesmen who maintained a regular
and systematic course of solicitation of orders for sales of taxpayer's
cement among Minrresota customers. The solicitation of orders was
from a leased sales office that was staffed by a "district manager"
and secretary and was used by the soliciting salesmen as a clearinghouse for their solicited orders. All orders were sent back to Iowa
from the taxing state for acceptance or rejection, and delivery of the
accepted orders was made from taxpayer's out-of-state plant. In
addition to their regular solicitation duties, the salesmen received
and transmitted to taxpayer claims of loss or damage in shipments
to purchasers. Forty-eight percent of taxpayer's total sales resulted
from the solicitation in the taxing state,'" which levied its net in6. 358 U.S. 450 (1959). For a detailed analysis of these 3 cases, see Hartman, State
Taxation of CorporateIncome from a Multistate Business, 13 VAND. L. REV. 21, 23-43 (1959).
7. 234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
8. 236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
9. The Northwestern States decision consolidated 2 cases, Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota and Williams v. Stockholm Valve & Fittings.
10. 358 U.S. at 454-55. Similarly, the Stockholm Valve case involved a Georgia tax on
the net income of a Delaware corporation with its principal office and plant in Alabama.
Taxpayer maintained a sales-service office that was headquarters for one salesman and a
secretary in the taxing state and that served 5 states. As in the Northwestern case, all orders
solicited by the salesmen in the taxing state were transmitted to an out-of-state source for
approval, and goods were shipped from that source to customers in the taxing state. Other
than office equipment, supplies, and advertising literature taxpayer had no property in the
taxing state; taxpayer's substantial connection with the taxing state was the above-described
solicitation of orders. From 1-2% of taxpayer's total sales originated in Georgia. To apportion
the net income attributable to the taxing state for tax purposes, the statute applied a 3-factor
ratio based on inventory, wages, and gross receipts. Id. at 455-57.
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come tax on the amount of taxpayer's income attributable to its
activities in Minnesota, as determined by a three-factor apportionment formula.
In meeting the due process clause claim, the Court observed
that "the 'controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can ask return.' ""'In giving short shrift to the due
process clause objection, the Court pointed out that the "taxes imposed are levied only on that portion of the taxpayer's net income
which arises from its activities within the taxing state. These activities form a sufficient 'nexus' between such a tax and transactions
within a state for which the tax? is an exaction."12 Exploitation of the
taxing state's market for the capture of profits, along with the protection afforded by the condition of the market during the process,
should be enough for the state to demand something in return, thus
satisfying the requisites of due process.
Addressing itself to the commerce clause question, the Court
squarely faced the question whether the clause bars the way to a tax
imposed upon that portion of a foreign corporation's net income
earned from, and fairly apportioned to, business activities within
the taxing state (Minnesota) when those activities are exclusively
in furtherance of interstate commerce. The Court concluded that
"the entire net income of a corporation, generated by intrastate as
well as interstate activities, may be fairly apportioned among the
States for tax purposes by formulas utilizing in-state aspects of
3
interstate affairs.'
Throughout the Northwestern States opinion run three main
themes regarding the commerce clause assault on the tax: First,
interstate commerce should bear its just share of state tax burdens
in return for the benefits it derives from activities within the taxing
state. Secondly, state taxes on net income should be sustained when
they do not discriminate against interstate commerce by giving
local business a direct commercial advantage and do not subject
interstate commerce to actual multiple tax burdens, which will
place that commerce at a competitive disadvantage relative to local
business. No such discrimination could be found by the Court, and
no actual multiple tax burdens on the net income by another state
were shown. Thirdly, the challenged taxes were not prohibited levies
11. Id. at 465, quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
12. 358 U.S. at 464, quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940).
13. 358 U.S. at 460. Justice Harlan filed a separate concurring opinion in which he
agreed with the majority of the Court that prior decisions did support the constitutionality
of the taxes in question. 354 U.S. at 469.
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upon the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Here the
Court preserved the distinction between a valid tax levied directly
"on" net income derived from interstate commerce, and an invalid
excise levied "on" the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce
and "measured by" the same net income.
A dissenting opinion of Justice Whittaker, with whom Justices
Frankfurter and Stewart joined, was of the thinking that the taxes
levied on the net income contravened the commerce clause since the
business was exclusively interstate commerce. These Justices were
of the view that the challenged taxes were laid directly on, and
thereby were prohibited regulation of, exclusively interstate commerce. Justice Frankfurter also delivered a separate dissenting
opinion in Northwestern States. For him the result of this decision
was "to break new ground," because he thought that the Court had
"never decided that a State may tax a corporation when the tax is
on income related to the State by virtue of activities within it when
such activities are exclusively part of the process of doing interstate
commerce."' 4 He did not think the Court should take this new step.
Likewise, Justice Frankfurter took the very realistic and pragmatic
view that small or moderate sized corporations doing exclusively
interstate business would now be faced with new and pressing problems because such concerns would be required to keep informed of
the tax laws of all the states in which they did business and would
be required to file tax returns in many more states than heretofore,
all of which would involve large increases in bookkeeping, accounting, and legal cobwebs to meet these new business-hampering demands. Justice Frankfurter stated that the problem of taxation of
interstate business is one that clearly calls for a legislative solution.
Congress alone, he reasoned, can provide for a full and thorough
canvassing of the multitudinous and intricate factors that compose
the problem of the taxing freedom of the states and the needed
limits on such state taxing power. Only Congress, the Justice
thought, can formulate policies founded upon economic realities.' 5
The majority opinion also recognized that there is a congressional "'need for clearing up the tangled underbrush of past cases'
with reference to the taxing power of the States.""8 Thus both the
majority and dissenting views in the Northwestern States case demonstrated a judicially recognized need for congressional action in the
14.
15.
16.

358 U.S. at 470 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 457.
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formulation of a realistic policy for state and local taxation of interstate business.
Suppose the taxpayer in Northwestern States had not had offices in the taxing state. Would the tax have been held inimical to
the commerce clause, and would there have been a "sufficient
nexus" to satisfy due process requirements for a tax imposed upon
the net income? The two subsequent cases of Brown-FormanDistillers Corp. v. Collector of Revenue1 7 and InternationalShoe Co. v.
Fontenot 8 soon shed some light on these questions. In BrownForman the Supreme Court of the United States granted a motion
to dismiss the appeal and refused certiorari from a decision of the
Louisiana court that the imposition of the Louisiana net income tax
upon a Kentucky distiller does not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce, even though the only connection of the taxed foreign corporation with the taxing state was the presence of "missionary men" who called on wholesalers but did not solicit orders. The
''missionary men" on occasion accompanied the salesmen of these
wholesalers and assisted them in displaying the taxpayer's merchandise at retail business establishments. Unlike Northwestern
States, in Brown-Forman there were no sales offices in the taxing
state, and the taxpayer's "missionary men" did not have authority
to solicit orders.
Similarly, in InternationalShoe Co. v. Fontenot, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari in a case from Louisiana holding that regular
and systematic solicitation of orders by fifteen salesmen was sufficient to subject a foreign corporation engaged in a purely interstate
operation to a Louisiana apportioned net income tax. Samples of
shoes in the custody of its salesmen and company-owned automobiles used by the salesmen constituted the taxpayer's sole property
in the taxing state. Furthermore, at the expense of the taxpayer the
salesmen displayed samples in the taxing state, using hotel rooms
or rooms of public buildings.
The breadth of the Supreme Court's language in the
Northwestern States case, especially when coupled with its refusal
to review the two cases of Brown-Forman and InternationalShoe,
caused many observers to think that quite marginal activities might
be held to create net income tax liabilities. The concern with the
possibility of this expansion in scope of state and local taxing power
provided the primary impetus for the enactment of Public Law 8617.
18.

234 La. 651, 101 So. 2d 70 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 28 (1959).
236 La. 279, 107 So. 2d 640 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 984 (1959).
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272."1 This trilogy of decisions by the Supreme Court of the United
States constituted the percussive force that caused representatives
of business to voice their consternation to Congress to curtail the
sweep of these cases. In response to this pressure, somewhat truncated congressional hearings were held."0 At these hearings the fears
and apprehensions of businesses rang like a forte anvil chorus, in
comparison with only a pianissimo refrain from the tax collectors
and others counselling congressional caution. Businessmen asked
Congress to remove what they regarded as a loblolly of confusion
and uncertainty in the tax field and to establish minimal jurisdictional standards on the amount of activity in which foreign business
could engage without incurring state and local tax liability. Specifically, Congress was urged to enact a law that would bar the imposition of net income taxes on businesses whose only activity in a
particular state was the solicitation of orders.
I.

THE ENACTMENT AND SCOPE OF PuBLIc LAW

86-272

The pressures described above achieved the enactment of Public Law 86-272. The sense of urgency with which the Law was
drafted and enacted prompted one commentator to describe Public
Law 86-272 as "a piece of hasty, hysteria legislation . . . pressured
through. . . Congress by a highly organized and certainly skillfully
handled group of trade organizations. ' ' 2'
From the date of its enactment, there has been diversity of
opinion about the wisdom of Public Law 86-272. At the hearings
held by the Committee on Finance of the United States Senate this
congressional curb on state and local power to tax net income was
vigorously criticized. The authors of the minority report of the Committee 22 considered the legislation to be an invasion by Congress of
the states' inherent power to raise needed taxes. The minority report
also expressed the view that the congressional limitation was nothing more than a protective measure for a few manufacturing states
and a few companies that do a specific type of multistate business. 23
19.

1 REPORT

OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTER-STATE COMMERCE

OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

[hereinafter cited as WILLS

H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., at 145 (1964)

SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].

20. Id. at 8.
21. Roland, State Taxation of Interstate Income: A State Tax Administrator's
Viewpoint, 12 TAx EXEC. 35 (Oct. 1959).
22. REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, STATE TAXATION OF INCOME DERIVED FROM
INTERSTATE COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 658, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-14 (1959). The minority
report was given by Senators Albert Gore and Eugene McCarthy and included the individual
view of Senator Russell B. Long, who also opposed the Bill.
23. Id.
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Attacks were mounted against Public Law 86-272 on the ground
that Congress had overstepped its powers under the commerce
clause. Nevertheless, the Law has successfully weathered these onslaughts.24
Title II of Public Law 86-272 authorized only a congressional
study of net income taxes. The statute later was amended to authorize expanded hearings on all matters pertaining to the taxation of
interstate commerce.2 5 Pursuant to this amendment additional
hearings were held by the Special Subcommittee charged with this
extensive four-year study of state taxation of interstate commerce.
At these hearings multistate business representatives urged that
Congress impose even more severe restrictions on states' taxing
power than those found in Public Law 86-272.28 State tax administrators, on the other hand, consider Congress' action too restrictive
and have continually recommended that the state's jurisdiction to
tax be freed from the arbitrary restriction of Public Law 86-272.17
As we have seen, the gist of this statute permits a company or
person whose net income is derived from interstate commerce to
send a representative into another state to solicit orders for the sale
of tangible personal property if the orders are sent out of state for
approval or rejection and, if approved, are filled by shipment or
delivery from a point outside the state, without that person or company being subject to a state or local net income tax2 8 in the state
of solicitation.
Excluding the immunity given to solicitations and delivery
through an "independent contractor" under Public Law 86-272,29
there are two basic types of solicitation activities that may be en24. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Cocreham, 246 La. 244, 164 So. 2d 314, cert.
denied sub nom. Mouton v. International Shoe Co., 379 U.S. 902 (1964); State ex rel. CIBA
Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964); Smith Kline
& French Laboratories v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965). For a succinct,
able comment on the constitutional power of Congress under the commerce clause to enact
Public Law 86-272, see 18 VAND. L. REv. 313 (1964). For a comprehensive treatment of the
power of Congress to enact regulatory and tax legislation, see Hartman & Sanders, The Power
of Congress to Prohibit Discriminationin the Assessment of Property of Interstate Carriers
for State Ad Valorem Taxes, 33 ICC PRAC. J. 654 (1966).
25. Act of Apr. 7, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-17, 75 Stat. 41, amending Pub. L. No. 86-272,
tit. II, 73 Stat. 555 (1959).
26. 1 WiLLis SUBCOMMITrEE REPORT 485. See also Dane, Small Business Looks at Public
Law 86-272 in the Perspective of Its Alternatives, 46 VA. L. REv. 1190 (1960).
27. See Cox, FederalLimit on State Taxes Is Unfair to Consuming States and to Local
Firms, 11 J. TAX. 354 (1959); Roland, PublicLaw 86-272: Regulation or Raid, 46 VA. L. REv.
1172 (1960).
28. "Net income tax" means any tax imposed on, or measured by net income. 15 U.S.C.
§ 383 (1970).
29. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
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gaged in by the sellers of tangible personal property without incurring net income tax consequences. The first type involves the solicitation of orders by the seller or his own representative. So long as
the orders are approved outside the state and are filled by shipment
or delivery from a point outside the state, solicitation is a protected
activity. Paragraph (1) of section 101, subsection (a) of Public Law
86-272 expressly allows:
the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State
for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outside the State
for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery
from a point outside the state.3

The second type of solicitation activities that may be engaged
in by the seller in the sale of tangible personal property without
creating for him net income tax liability is solicitation by the seller
or his own representative, as in the case of so-called "missionary
men," when the solicitation is directed toward obtaining orders in
the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer. This protection from net income taxation is contained in a rather awkward,
unclear sentence, found in paragraph (2) of section 101, subsection
(a), which gives immunity from the taxing power of state and local
governments when:
the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State
in the name of or for the benefit of a prospective customer of such person, if
orders by such customer to such person to enable such customer to fill orders
resulting from such solicitations are orders described in paragraph (1).31

The statute does not prohibit a tax on net income from any
sales activities except when the only business contact of the out-ofstate seller with the taxing state is simply the "solicitation" of orders that are sent out of the state for approval or rejection and, if
approved, are filled by "shipment or delivery" from a point outside
the taxing state. As stated above, the solicitation tax exemptions of
the statute apparently apply to the activities of "missionary men"
who seek orders in the name of or for the benefit of a customer of
the taxpayer.32 This was the situation in the Brown-Formancase, 33
in which Brown-Forman's representatives urged retailers to buy
Brown-Forman products, not directly from the company, but from
wholesalers in the taxing state. The later examination of other cases
30. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1) (1970).
31. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(2) (1970).
32. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
33. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
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will deal with this facet of "solicitation" under Public Law 86-272.1'
Viewed as a temporary "stopgap" measure pending further study of
the problem,3 5 the statute expressly insulates from net income taxation only the foreign seller satisfying the conditions of Public Law
86-272, and does not apply to companies incorporated in the taxing
state or to individuals domiciled or residing there. 6
Regrettably, Public Law 86-272 does not define the critical term
"solicitation." The power of a state to tax foreign business remains,
therefore, a question for the courts to decide. Furthermore, since the
United States Supreme Court has not yet given a determinative
interpretation of this federal statute, the meaning of solicitation is
subjected to the interpretations of the courts of fifty separate states.
The ambiguity is compounded by the very real question of
whether Public Law 86-272 actually abrogates the precise holding
of the Northwestern States case. Does the tax immunity given by
Public Law 86-272 extend to solicitation from the taxpayer's own
offices in the taxing state, as in the NorthwesternStates situation?37
Heublein, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission," a 1972 Supreme Court decision, clearly declares that "[t]he impetus behind
the enactment of § 381 [Public Law 86-272] was this Court's opinion in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota
... ,3 Nevertheless, legislative history suggests that the Northwestern States holding may remain unblemished by Public Law
86-272. The original bill, as reported out of the Senate Finance
Committee, exempted from net income taxation the following:
(3) the maintenance and operation by such person, or by his representative,
in such State of an office the primary purpose and use of which is to serve
representatives of such person who are engaged in solicitation of orders described in paragraph (1) or (2), or both, and to receive, process, and forward
such orders."

This particular provision was stricken from the bill by a vote of
34. See Part II A (1) infra.
35. During the Senate floor debate Senator Saltonstall stated: "What the bill does, in
substance, is to put the matter in status quo until the Finance Committee, which, as I
understand it, is going to study the subject, will know whether there should be any further
changes in the law or not." 105 CONG. REc. 16,354 (1959). For further reference to the stopgap
nature of the law, see 1 WILLIS SuacoMMrrrEE REPORT 438-39.

36. 15 U.S.C. § 381(b) (1970).
37. See notes 9-12 supra and accompanying text.
38. 409 U.S. 275 (1972).
39. Id. at 279.
40.

105 CONG. REc. 16,470 (1959) (emphasis added).
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sixty-five to twenty-nine on an amendment sponsored by Senator
Talmadge of Georgia on August 20, 1959.41
A.

The Meaning of "Solicitation" and "Delivery" under Public
Law 86-272: The Cases
The next section of this article will examine the practical application of Public Law 86-272 and the thorny problems inherent in
defining the "solicitation" of orders and the "delivery" of goods so
solicited, activities which give rise to tax immunity under the statute. Since Congress failed to provide any guidance on the meaning
of "solicitation" and "delivery," it of necessity compelled the states
to provide their own definitions, thus leaving to the state courts the
task of determining when an out-of-state seller is doing more than
solicitation and delivery within the taxing state for purposes of net
income tax liability. Further, since the judiciary has no caliper with
which to measure the exact quantum and nature of activities that
constitute more than "solicitation" and "delivery," varying interpretations could be expected. The result, ironically, has been a diversity of interpretations of a federal statute enacted to secure some
semblance of certainty and uniformity in one area of the taxation
of multistate businesses.
The state court decisions have wound a tortuous path in defining solicitation and delivery. They have veered from a liberal construction that permits a foreign seller to conduct many activities
incidental to solicitation without sacrificing the protection of the
statute, to a more narrow interpretation that affords less protection
to the out-of-state seller. Moreover, this fluctuation in defining solicitation and delivery, as shown below, has taken place within the
same jurisdiction.
In practice the problem is compounded by the fact that the
question of the interpretation of solicitation and delivery has been
presented in two ways to the state courts. Public Law 86-272 has not
been a one-sided escape valve. First, under the only express meaning of the statute, the out-of-state seller has contended that it is
exempt from net income tax because its activities within the taxing
state do not exceed "solicitation." In addition, the states have
grafted onto this federal statute a correlative use to prevent a
domestic seller from assigning for tax apportionment a part of its
multistate net income to another state. The states' theories have
been that the taxpayer, because of Public Law 86-272, is not subject
41.

Id.
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to a tax in the other state on its income from the business activities
conducted in that state, since it is only soliciting orders or making
deliveries there; hence, the domestic taxpayer is not taxable by the
other state, and no assignment of its multistate income to the other
state should be permitted.
In either situation in which Public Law 86-272 is invoked, the
breadth of the interpretation of "solicitation" and "delivery" often
is determinative of the outcome of the case. Since the former situation, the assertion by the out-of-state taxpayer of the "solicitation"
immunity, is the one that occurs most frequently, it will be examined first.
(1)

Invocation of Public Law 86-272 by the Foreign Seller to
Escape Taxation

The state courts of Oregon have been in the forefront in the
interpretation of "solicitation" and "delivery." Indeed, an examination of Oregon's decisions reveals the judicial uncertainty that prevails. Oregon has waivered from an early liberal construction of
"solicitation," which enabled the foreign seller with substantial instate activities to escape taxation, to a more narrow interpretation
of "solicitation," which affords the foreign seller less protection from
taxation, with a resulting increase in tax revenue.
The early case of Smith Kline & French Laboratoriesv. State
Tax Commission12 squarely presented to the Supreme Court of Oregon the question of the scope of "solicitation." There the court held
that the activities of the taxpayer, a foreign corporation, did not
exceed the boundaries of "solicitation"; hence the seller was exempt
from taxation under Public Law 86-272. The parties stipulated the
facts. Taxpayer, a Pennsylvania corporation, manufactures pharmaceutical products in interstate commerce. Within the taxing
state of Oregon taxpayer had no office, no office equipment, no stock
of goods, no telephone listing, no mailing address, and no automobile. To conduct its activity in the taxing state, taxpayer employed
five or six resident professional representatives, so-called "detail
men." Taxpayer reimbursed these representatives for the use of
their own cars and other expenses and provided them with samples
and sales material. Under the supervision of taxpayer's out-of-state
office, these "detail men" visited hospitals, other institutions, doctors, and retailers and wholesalers handling taxpayer's products to
explain the use and usefulness of the products and to encourage
42.

241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d 375 (1965).
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their use and sale. While the "detail men" did occasionally solicit
orders, their primary function was to promote the use of taxpayer's
products. At their homes the "detail men" maintained stocks of
samples for promotional use. Among the ultimate product users
only state institutions dealt directly with taxpayer. All other ultimate users purchased from retailers. The retailers in turn purchased
from wholesalers, whose salesmen solicited from druggists, hospitals, and institutions. Oregon wholesalers placed orders with taxpayer at its out-of-state office, where the orders were accepted.
Oregon levied its corporate net income tax against taxpayer
who resisted payment of the tax under Public Law 86-272 on the
theory that it was engaged only in the "solicitation of orders" in the
taxing state and thus was exempt from the tax. The taxing state,
on the other hand, contended that Public Law 86-272 creates an
"island of immunity" around solicitation activity and that solicitation of orders requires that an actual order be sought by an individual calling upon a potential customer. The taxing state thus maintained that the activities of the taxpayer's representatives, who
merely encouraged the placing of orders with the wholesale drug
firms selling taxpayer's products, did not qualify taxpayer for exemption under Public Law 86-272. 41
Taxpayer contended that the statute properly should be construed as a "minimum activity" statute-that it exempts all corporations the activities of which do not exceed solicitation of orders.
Further, taxpayer contended that its employees in the taxing state
did solicit orders for the taxpayer's customers within the meaning
of Public Law 86-272 and that the statute does not require the
receipt of an order by taxpayer's representatives, so long as they
were soliciting and encouraging the purchase of taxpayer's products.44 This argument would seem to square with paragraph (2),
section 101, subsection (a) of Public Law 86-272, which exempts
45
solicitation of customers' customers.
The Supreme Court of Oregon, adopting portions of the lower
court's opinion, held that the activities of taxpayer's employees did
not exceed the bounds of "solicitation," and taxpayer was exempted
from the tax. Citing legislative history, the Oregon court concluded
that the legislative reports of congressional hearings show that
"Congress intended to exempt not only the specifically described
phase of interstate sales efforts but also all lesser, included
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 54-55, 403 P.2d at 377.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(2) (1970). See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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phases."" Moreover, the court concluded that "the nature of plaintiff's [taxpayer's] business makes its activities in Oregon [the taxing state] the equivalent of solicitation of orders in other, less technical business." Again the court added: "[b]y soliciting the stocking of plaintiff's [taxpayer's] products by druggists and the prescription of those drugs by physicians, plaintiff's detail men performed the same sales function in plaintiff's field that salesmen
soliciting actual orders from the users perform in other busi47
nesses."
To conclude, the highest tribunal of Oregon reasoned that a
realistic legal and factual interpretation of the "solicitation" feature
of Public Law 86-272 required exemption of taxpayer from the corporate tax of Oregon (the taxing state). The rationale of the Oregon
court thus adopted a broad interpretation of "solicitation."
The "all lesser, included phases" rationale of Smith Kline &
French seemed to have established a strong and deep beachhead for
the interests of multistate business, and it threatened to make substantial inroads into the taxing power of the states. Yet, within two
years the broad compass of "solicitation" that found lodgment in
the Smith Kline & Frenchrationale was significantly eroded by the
more narrow interpretation by the same Oregon court in Herf Jones
Co. v. State Tax Commission.
In Herff Jones taxpayer was a foreign corporation engaged in
the sale of school class rings. Taxpayer had a contract with Master
Engravers, Inc. (Masters), making the latter the franchise agent for
taxpayer in the taxing state of Oregon and in other western states.
Four resident Oregon salesmen handled and solicited orders for taxpayer's product and also sold merchandise for Masters and other
companies. Primarily they contacted schools. When a salesman
called on a school to solicit orders for class rings, he was required
by taxpayer to secure a five dollar deposit on each ring sold. The
orders were then sent to an out-of-state source from which the orders
were shipped to the buyers. The salesman or the school could also
collect the balance and forward it to Masters. Taxpayer had no
office, place of business, or telephone listing in Oregon (the taxing
state), and taxpayer owned no property in Oregon except the salesmen's samples.
When Oregon imposed its corporate income tax on the part of
taxpayer's income earned in Oregon, taxpayer invoked the exemp46. 241 Ore. at 55, 403 P.2d at 377 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 56, 403 P.2d at 378.
48. 247 Ore. 404, 430 P.2d 998 (1967).
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tion of Public Law 86-272, claiming that it was engaged only in
soliciting orders. On the question of whether the activity of the
salesmen within Oregon went beyond mere solicitation so as to remove taxpayer from the protection of Public Law 86-272, the Oregon
Supreme Court held against taxpayer. It rejected the broad interpretation of solicitation found in the rationale of the Oregon court
in its prior Smith Kline & French decision as not warranted. In
sweeping language, Herff Jones declared that "it seems clear that
in order to come within the purview of Public Law 86-272 the only
business activity which plaintiff's sales representatives could engage in is the solicitation of orders."'" Further, the court declared
that it is "abundantly clear from the record that the representatives
do more than this."5 The court observed that taxpayer's salesmen,
aside from actually soliciting orders, also collect an initial deposit
on the merchandise ordered and forward the deposits to taxpayer.
The sales representatives on occasion also collect the balance due
on the merchandise when it is delivered to the school and do other
collection work for taxpayer. Additionally school officials and local
jewelers aid in handling taxpayer's sales for compensation. The
Herff Jones court held that taxpayer's activities within the taxing
state went beyond mere solicitation of orders for taxpayer's goods
and thus taxpayer was held liable for the Oregon net income tax.
The Herff Jones decision thus seemingly rejected the broad "all
lesser, included activities" standard previously established in
Smith Kline & French. The Oregon court apparently scuttled the
idea that it would "exempt not only the specifically described phase
of interstate sales efforts but also all lesser, included phases"5
-activities it had described as nontaxable in Smith Kline &
French. In its place the court substituted a more restrictive view
of the "solicitation" immunity.
In the year following Herff Jones the Oregon court again employed a narrow construction of the curb of Public Law 86-272 on
net income taxation. In Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Commission,52
the Oregon Tax Court considered the net income tax liability of a
foreign corporation doing business in Oregon. Taxpayer, a Delaware
corporation with its principal office in Wisconsin, was not licensed
to do business in the taxing state of Oregon and had no office and
owned no property there. Taxpayer's main business was the manu49.
50.
51.
375, 377
52.

Id. at 412, 430 P.2d at 1001-02.
Id. at 412, 430 P.2d at 1002.
Smith Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Ore. 50, 55, 403 P.2d
(1965).
3 Ore. Tax Rep. 174 (1968).
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facture and sale of gasoline engines. Orders for the sale of engines
in the taxing state were accepted at an out-of-state source from
which the merchandise was shipped to customers in the taxing
state. Taxpayer sold its engines to ten customers. Nine of them were
equipment manufacturers who purchased taxpayer's engines for
motive power in their manufactured product. The remaining customer was Tracey & Company, a central warehouse distributor who
acted as an independent contractor in handling and distributing
taxpayer's products in the taxing state. Taxpayer's only representative in Oregon, an out-of-state salaried sales and service supervisor,
spent approximately one week of every eight weeks in the taxing
state. Contacting the nine equipment manufacturers, this supervisor gave engineering advice and encouraged the manufacturers to
buy Briggs & Stratton engines. Taxpayer's same supervisor also
maintained a close liaison with Tracey & Company, inspecting Tracey's tools to see that they were adequate to repair the taxpayer's
engines, instructed the manufacturers on proper service techniques,
assisted Tracey with any problem as a sort of troubleshooter, and
made sure that Tracey's inventory was adequate. Taxpayer's supervisor did not make collections or repossessions, approve credit, accept payments, or make any deliveries of merchandise. Nor did he
engage in newspaper advertising in the taxing state, but he did
provide up-to-date service manuals. Taxpayer's supervisor, along
with Tracey, conducted three or four service schools in the taxing
state each year for the benefit of the personnel of Tracey and others.
At the school the supervisor showed the mechanics how to repair
and service taxpayer's products. Two other members of taxpayer's
out-of-state organization also assisted at these schools.
Over taxpayer's objection that it was exempt from the corporate net income tax by reason of Public Law 86-272, the court upheld the levy of the tax on the ground that taxpayer's activities in
the taxing state were more than solicitation of orders in Oregon. The
court pointed out that taxpayer's sales and service supervisor rectified complaints, gave technical engineering advice to customers,
approved the appointment of service distributors, conducted training schools, lectured on service techniques, and inspected the customers' inventory.5 3 Coupled with Herff Jones, the Briggs &
Stratton decision makes it apparent that the broad "all lesser, included phases" interpretation of "solicitation" enunciated in Smith
Kline & French is no longer a viable doctrine in Oregon.
53. Id. at 180.
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In a recent decision that appears to have no unusual significance, the Oregon court in Olympia Brewing Co. v. Department of
Revenue54 held that the presence in the taxing state (Oregon) of beer
kegs belonging to taxpayer (a foreign corporation), for the purpose
of dispensing taxpayer's draft beer, was sufficient to exclude the
taxpayer from the corporate net income tax immunity granted by
Public Law 86-272. Despite taxpayer's determined protestations to
the contrary, the court concluded that the presence of the beer kegs
in the taxing state went beyond the congressionally prescribed tax
exemption benchmark of only "solicitation of orders" for the sale of
tangible personal property within the taxing state.5
While Oregon seems to have been in the vanguard of those
states formulating guidelines for "solicitation" as a tax-exempt activity under Public Law 86-272, a number of other states also have
been confronted with Public Law 86-272 as a potential roadblock to
the imposition of net income taxes. Missouri found the question of
the breadth of the "solicitation" immunity dumped on its judicial
doorstep in State ex rel. CIBA PharmaceuticalProducts, Inc. v.
State Tax Commission."6 In the 1964 CIBA case, the Missouri Supreme Court struggled with the scope of "solicitation" with respect
to the net income tax of Missouri in a factual situation not unlike
that presented in Smith Kline & French. In CIBA the taxpayer, a
New Jersey corporation with its main offices in that state, was authorized to transact business in the taxing state. Taxpayer was a
pharmaceutical house that manufactured drugs and distributed
them throughout the United States. Taxpayer sold pharmaceutical
products to retail druggists, wholesale pharmaceutical companies,
and pharmacists at hospitals, as well as to doctors. In its business
taxpayer employed approximately twelve "professional service representatives" to solicit orders in Missouri. Some representatives
lived in the taxing state and operated from their homes there. The
orders taken by the representatives in Missouri were sent to taxpayer's out-of-state home office for approval or disapproval. The
approved orders were filled by shipment of the drugs into the taxing
state.
CIBA supplied its representatives with automobiles and reimbursed them for expenses, but CIBA owned no sales office, nor ware54. 266 Ore. 309, 511 P.2d 837 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 976 (1974).
55. From the viewpoint of the taxpayer, it is unlikely that it would, with a great deal
of animation, join in singing the chorus of that timeless polka, the name of which proved

taxpayer's Waterloo: "Roll out the barrel. We'll have a barrel of fun."
56.

382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964).
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houses in the taxing state. Although solicitation of orders from retail
druggists and pharmacists was the principal duty of taxpayer's representatives in the taxing state, they also left promotional materials
with the druggists and sometimes assisted the pharmacists in taking
inventory. Taxpayer's representatives also visited or "detailed" doctors in their territories, explaining the therapeutic value of taxpayer's products to the doctors. In so doing, the representatives
explained what the product was, what it would do, and left literature and samples. Concededly, the main object in "detailing" the
doctors was to persuade them to write prescriptions for taxpayer's
products.
Missouri imposed its corporate net income tax on income resulting from taxpayer's activities in Missouri. Taxpayer claimed
income tax immunity under Public Law 86-272 on the basis that its
Missouri activities did not transcend the "solicitation of orders."
The Missouri Tax Commission adopted a "show me" attitude, contending that taxpayer's activities did exceed the boundaries of "so7
licitation" and thus the exemption was not available to taxpayer.1
The Missouri court disagreed and granted taxpayer an exemption
from the tax, on the ground that taxpayer's activities in the taxing
state did not exceed the minimum exemption standards of Public
Law 86-272. While recognizing the scarcity of precedent construing
this provision of Public Law 86-272, the court stated that no "cases
or legal authorities have been found . . . which can be of any substantial aid in deciding what Public Law 86-272 actually means and
whether [taxpayer's] activities in Missouri come within the statutory minimum standard or not.15 The court concluded that the
statute "was hastily enacted, not very clear, and considerably restricted in scope. . .. ""
In buttressing its decision to exempt taxpayer from the net
income tax, the Missouri court took the position:
We find nothing ... to indicate [that] any business or financial transactions
took place when the representatives "detailed" the doctors, or when they distributed free samples, or when they gave out literature, or when the representatives met together ....1'

To conclude, the court added, "[T]hese were not business transactions where finances were involved or taxable income produced ..
57.

."6

Id. at 651-52.

58. Id. at 652.
59. Id.
60.
61.

Id.
Id.
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In arriving at its decision that taxpayer's activities did not
exceed solicitation of orders because they were not business transactions since they did not produce a direct transfer of money or product, the court seems impervious to the realistic impact of the extensive promotional program of taxpayer in producing business.
The CIBA court complained of lack of precedent. One can only
speculate as to the outcome of that case if the more immunityrestrictive decisions of Herff Jones and Briggs & Stratton" had been
decided before CIBA reached the Missouri judiciary. Since the
activities held exempt in CIBA likely would have exceeded the
"solicitation of orders" under the now prevailing Oregon standard,
there would not have been the paucity of precedent that so
bothered the CIBA court. Moreover, it might not be utterly amiss
to ask why taxpayer was spending its money for its representatives
to flood Missouri by "detailing" the doctors, distributing free
samples, handing out literature, and holding meetings of representatives, if not in the hope of later reaping a harvest of business
or financial rewards. Still the Missouri court myopically viewed
these activities as not being "business transactions where finances
were involved or taxable income produced." 3 It is a bit difficult for
this writer to believe that such activities sprang from motives of
pure altruism on the part of CIBA.
The CIBA court's apparent disregard for the promotional activities carried on by taxpayer's representatives in the taxing state may
be contrasted to the later decision of the New Jersey court in the
4 calling into judgment a New Jercase of Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley,"
sey net income tax, which was resisted under the exemption provisions of Public Law 86-272. In Clairol, taxpayer was a Delaware
corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of hair coloring
preparations and cosmetics. Taxpayer, who was not authorized to
do business in the taxing state, had no retail outlets there. It sold
basically to (a) wholesalers who sold to local drugstores, (b) retail
drug chains, (c) "beauty jobbers" who sold to local beauty salons,
and (d) a miscellany of other nonretail customers, including food
chains, rack jobbers who sold to small food markets, department
stores, and variety stores. Taxpayer advertised on a national scope
on the major television networks and radio, and in magazines and
newspapers. Taxpayer had no formal office in the taxing state, nor
62. See text accompanying notes 42-43, 48-53 supra.
63. 382 S.W.2d at 652.
64. 109 N.J. Super. 22, 262 A.2d 213 (App. Div.), afj'd, 57 N.J. 199, 270 A.2d 702 (1970),
appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 902 (1971).
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any real estate, office furniture, telephone, or bank account there.
Detailmen worked under the personal supervision of a district
manager. Their duties included paying visits to retail druggists regularly so as to review the display of taxpayer's products, rotate its
products, and take inventories. If the inventory disclosed a need for
new stock, an order would be written up with the assistance of the
detailmen and would be sent by the druggist to a wholesaler with
whom the druggist normally traded. Orders by wholesalers or other
major contacts were not accepted within the taxing state. Furthermore, taxpayer employed other representatives who called on
"beauty jobbers" who purchased taxpayer's product. Although
these representatives who called on the beauty salons did very little
in the way of order taking, they had technical backgrounds and their
main function was to visit the beauty salon to tell its operators how
best to use taxpayer's products and to demonstrate new techniques.
The taxing state (New Jersey) assessed against the taxpayer its
corporate business tax computed on the basis of the taxpayer's net
worth and net income, both determined on the basis of instant
activities. Taking the position that its activities within the taxing
state did not transgress the boundaries of "solicitation," taxpayer
argued that Public Law 86-272 specifically invalidated both taxes.
The court examined the various duties performed by taxpayer's
detailmen and representatives in the course of their jobs, and concluded that it "is . . . evident that Clairol's [taxpayer's] business
activities in New Jersey extend beyond the mere solicitation of orders either on its own behalf or on behalf of its wholesalers.", 5 Taxpayer was held liable for the tax. In contrast to the Missouri court
in CIBA, the New Jersey court recognized the economic substance
behind the promotional activities of taxpayer's representatives and
held Clairol subject to the tax. The court noted:
That increased public favor of Clairol's products will eventually result in increased orders from retail druggists to wholesalers and from wholesalers to
Clairol, or as in the case of its hair products from beauty salons to "beauty
jobbers" and from the latter to Clairol, does not blanket all Clairol's activities
with the protection afforded by the federal act to cases where the only business
of the taxpayer is the solicitation of orders."

The Clairol court expressly rejected the broad interpretation of
solicitation promulgated in the Smith Kline & French and CIBA
cases and adopted the narrower Herff Jones interpretation of "solicitation of orders." The court concluded that the taxpayer's activities
65. Id. at 30, 262 A.2d at 217-18.
66. Id. at 30, 262 A.2d at 218.
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in the taxing state (New Jersey) exceeded the boundaries of activity
insulated from net income taxation by Public Law 86-272. Also, the
court refused to follow CIBA, which held that since no business or
financial transactions took place when the taxpayer's representatives "detailed" customer doctors, as described above, taxpayer
was within the scope of exempt solicitation."
Some of the activities involved in both CIBA and Clairol appear
to fall within the "missionary man" operations where the solicitation of a customer is insulated from the tax by Public Law 86-272.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas, too, adhering to the rationale
of Herff Jones in Oregon and Clairol in New Jersey, adopted what
the Arkansas court regarded as a narrow construction of "solicitation of orders" under Public Law 86-272 in the 1971 decision of
Hervey v. AMF Beaird, Inc.68 In Hervey, the taxpayer, a foreign
corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of propane gas
storage tanks, resisted the application to it of Arkansas' income tax
on the ground of the Public Law 86-272 exemption. Taxpayer employed a salesman who made monthly calls upon retail dealers in
Arkansas, checked the retailer's inventory, which was maintained
perhaps on consignment, solicited orders, and billed the retailer as
he sold taxpayer's products to the public. Occasionally the salesman
accepted payment on behalf of taxpayer when the salesman came
around to check inventory. The salesman received the orders for
transmittal to taxpayer's extra-state home office where the orders
were accepted or rejected.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of taxpayer
on the ground that taxpayer's activities did not exceed "solicitation
of orders." On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas found that
taxpayer's salesmen exceeded solicitation when they regularly
checked the retailers' inventories. The court reversed the trial
court's summary judgment for taxpayer and remanded the case for
further proceedings on the fact question of whether the relationship
between taxpayer and its customers involved consignment or sale of
tangible personal property. If the customer had taxpayer's goods on
consignment, he would be selling for taxpayer. Thus, it is hard to
see how the salesman could be said to be soliciting orders for the
"sale" of tangible personal property in the consignment situation.
Under these circumstances, the Public Law 86-272 exemptions
would have no application to taxpayer.
67.
68.

See text accompanying note 61 supra.
250 Ark. 147, 464 S.W.2d 557 (1971).
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The different approaches taken by the courts of these various
states highlight the shortcoming of Public Law 86-272-its failure
to give 'realistic and predictable guidelines for the interpretation of
"solicitation." The conflicting interpretations point up the need for
uniform legislative or judicial guidance in this "stop gap" quagmire
that has been fermenting for over sixteen years. Since its hasty
enactment of Public Law 86-272 in September 1959, Congress has
not acted to provide any practical standards for determining the
meaning of "solicitation." Likewise, any guidance from the United
States Supreme Court will be found in decisions by that Court yet
to be written. In the meantime, the fifty states are left to wrestle
individually with the problem.
The situation resulting from a comparison of the two different
approaches typified by the CIBA case in Missouri and the Clairol
case in New Jersey clearly demonstrates the type of problem facing
out-of-state sellers in determining whether their activities are protected as "solicitation of orders" under Public Law 86-272. The
same seller performing the same activities in two separate states
may find itself subject to tax in one state and not in the other. Since
the test for "solicitation of orders" used by the courts of one state
is not binding upon the courts of another, there is no touchstone by
which the seller can find a satisfactory answer to its tax problems.
Thus, it is virtually impossible for a corporation to structure its
activities in anticipation of tax consequences, and in many states
this uncertainty allegedly has led to a failure on the part of corporations to file any tax return in close situations. 9 Hence, the failure
to have trustworthy guidelines on the meaning of "solicitation" is
most unfortunate for both the taxpayer and the taxing authority.
(2) The Invocation of Public Law 86-272 by the Taxing State to
Prevent Apportionment of Net Income from a Multistate Operation
Although Public Law 86-272, as expressly stated in the statute,
properly can be invoked only by a foreign seller attempting to avoid
taxation of income resulting from its activities in the taxing state,
nevertheless the taxing states have read into the statute by implication the power to invoke Public Law 86-272 to expand their taxing
jurisdiction. This situation seemingly has been confined to situations in which domestic corporations, engaged in multistate business, seek to reduce their domestic taxes by apportioning a part of
their net income to another state. The state, on the other hand,
69. See 1 WILLIS

SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 152.
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takes the position that when the provisions of Public Law 86-272
exempt the taxpayer from a tax in the other state, no apportionment
should be permitted and that the home state should be permitted
to tax the entire net income generated by the corporation's multistate or multinational business. The taxpayer, on the other hand,
contends, in resisting, that its activities in a foreign state exceed
"solicitation" and render it subject to the taxing power of the foreign state; hence it should be permitted to apportion its multistate
income to reduce its domestic tax liability and perhaps escape multiple taxation.
Whether this is a proper construction of this federal statute by
the state courts to increase their tax take is but another of the
questionable and perplexing perquisites peremptorily preempted by
the states, since there is no congressional nor judicial polestar by
which the courts must steer the ship of state in construing Public
Law 86-272.
One of the early cases in which this position was squarely and
clearly presented is Cal-Roof Wholesale, Inc. v. State Tax
Commission.0 Again we find the Supreme Court of Oregon front
and center on the judicial stage in the controversy over whether
taxpayer's extra-state activities constituted more than the solicitation of orders as contemplated by Public Law 86-272. Taxpayer, a
domestic corporation of the taxing state (Oregon), was a distributor
of building materials in Oregon and Washington. It conducted operations in Washington through a salesman living in that state.
When the taxing state of Oregon levied its corporate net income
tax on taxpayer's total net income, taxpayer sought to apportion a
part of its multistate income to the state of Washington. The taxing
state had a statute permitting apportionment of income in a multistate business. Washington had no income tax statute. The court
of the taxing state (Oregon) took the position, however, that the
taxpayer had sufficient activities in Washington in connection with
solicitation of orders for building materials that taxpayer sold in
Washington to permit Washington, if it had a law like the taxing
state's corporate income tax law, to impose a tax on that portion of
taxpayer's income attributable to its Washington activities. The
Oregon court stated the issue before it in the following language:
"Does the taxpayer, an Oregon corporation engaged in certain limited activities in the state of Washington, qualify to exclude from
its net income subject to the Oregon excise tax that portion of in70.

242 Ore. 435, 410 P.2d 233 (1966).
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come attributable to the activities in the state of Washington?"'"
Over the objections of state taxing officials, the Oregon court
permitted apportionment. The court held that the operations of
taxpayer in Washington took it out of the solicitation of orders protection of Public Law 86-272. The following excerpt from the court's
opinion sums up the whole matter in a nutshell:
The plaintiff's [taxpayer's] Washington operations were carried on by a salesman living in Washington. His chief activity was the solicitation of orders
which were approved in the Oregon home office. Most deliveries of goods were
made from Oregon in trucks leased by the plaintiff in Oregon. The plaintiff's
Washington salesman operated entirely within the State of Washington and
lived there but maintained no office except for his home. Plaintiff customarily
entered into cooperative advertising agreements in Washington with its Washington customers. In addition to his principal activity, soliciting orders, the
Washington salesman on numerous occasions collected delinquent accounts,

made pick-ups of merchandise which customers desired to return, and customarily carried with him a supply of small items which he sold and delivered
within the State of Washington. Also, he was authorized to and did on some
occasions give spot credit and accept
orders rather than submit them to the
72
home office in Oregon for approval.

The Oregon court also expressed the view that it would be a violation of the commerce clause to subject taxpayer to double taxation
(if Oregon were permitted to tax the entire income), since taxpayer
had sufficient nexus in Washington potentially to be taxed there.
In a later case before the Oregon Supreme Court involving apportionment, the state again took the position that it was entitled
to tax all of the income of a domestic corporation engaged in multistate business, on the ground that the taxpayer's activities outside
the taxing state were immune from tax in other states under the
"solicitation" immunity of Public Law 86-272. In Iron Fireman
Manufacturing Co. v. State Tax Commission,73 taxpayer, a domestic corporation of Oregon (the taxing state), was engaged in the
manufacture of airplane parts, which it sold to the Boeing Aircraft
Company in Seattle, Washington. Orders by Boeing for taxpayer's
products were not taken in business fashion because of the specialized character of the products involved, and because of the nature
of dealings between the two companies. The complex technical nature of the work necessitated the maintenance of close contact between taxpayer's manager and specialists for both companies. As a
result, taxpayer's officials maintained extremely close liaison with
the Boeing officials on the planning and design of the items so they
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 436-37, 410 P.2d at 234.
Id. at 448, 410 P.2d at 234.
251 Ore. 227, 445 P.2d 126 (1968).
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would be both functional and the most "economical for producibility."' After taxpayer and Boeing had agreed on a contract for taxpayer to manufacture certain items, the close working relationship
continued between the specialists for both Boeing and taxpayer.
Many of taxpayer's officials made regular trips to Boeing in Washington to take care of manufacturing problems, installation problems, repair work, redesign discussions, and production problems
that occurred after the work had started on the manufactured parts.
Taxpayer's production engineers, production workers, metallurgists, quality control managers, and assembly supervisors were some
of the officials who spent several weeks of the year working closely
with Boeing in Washington.
When Oregon levied its corporate income tax against taxpayer's
total net income, taxpayer took the position that it was entitled to
exclude from its total income that portion resulting from operations
in the state of Washington. The taxing officials of Oregon opposed
this apportionment on the ground that taxpayer's activities in
Washington did not exceed "solicitation of orders" under Public
Law 86-272; hence taxpayer was immune from taxation in Washington. Consequently, reasoned the taxing officials, Oregon, as the
home state of this domestic corporation, could tax the total income,
although Oregon had a statute permitting apportionment of income
from a multistate business.
In permitting taxpayer to apportion its net income from its
interstate business, the Oregon court was of the opinion that taxpayer's "mutual endeavor" with Boeing in Washington greatly exceeded the mere solicitation of orders under Public Law 86-272. The
factual connection of taxpayer with Boeing in Washington, warranting apportionment, is made clear from this quoted portion of the
Oregon court's pervasive opinion:
The record discloses that during 1960 and 1961, and for many years prior
thereto, [taxpayer] and Boeing had continuously engaged in a complex mutual endeavor to provide Boeing with a large variety of specially designed and
precisely engineered and manufactured parts for the airplanes manufactured
by Boeing. This mutual endeavor included fairly regular meetings and consultations between the personnel of both companies, principally in Seattle, but
also in Portland. There was an almost constant interchange and pooling of
talents, resources and expertise in the engineering, manufacturing, installation
and testing of the parts furnished by [taxpayer]. In our view, the relationship
between the parties involved far more activity than the mere solicitation of
orders. '
74. Id. at 231, 445 P.2d at 128.
75. Id. at 232, 445 P.2d at 128.
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The court expressed the view that the execution of contracts in
Washington did not seem to satisfy the requirement of Public Law
86-272 ,that all orders be accepted or rejected outside the taxing
state. The court, however, did not base its decision on this ground.
Instead, it held that taxpayer's activities in Washington exceeded
"solicitation ."76
Just why the state of Oregon would so strenuously try to torpedo apportionment in Iron Fireman on the ground that taxpayer
was engaged in no more than the solicitation of orders in Washington is nonplussing to this writer.
Similarly, in Hawes v. William L. Bonnell Co.,77 the Georgia
court was confronted with the question whether the taxing state
(Georgia) could employ the "solicitation" exemption to prevent a
multistate business from apportioning its income among the states
where it did business. Taxpayer, a Georgia corporation, attempted
to take advantage of a Georgia statute that authorizes apportionment of income when the taxpayer is doing business in several
states. Ninety-two percent of taxpayer's gross sales were made to
customers outside Georgia. Yet, the State Revenue Commissioner
contended that taxpayer's activities in other states did not constitute doing business there and thus taxpayer was not eligible to
apportion its income within the purview of the Georgia apportionment statute. Taxpayer argued that its activities in states outside
Georgia constituted doing business under the Georgia apportionment statute as interpreted by prior Georgia case law. As a second
string on his bow, taxpayer maintained that its out-of-state business
activities exceeded "solicitation" under Public Law 86-272, thus
bringing taxpayer within the reach of the tax laws of the other
states. Consequently, taxpayer maintained that it should be permitted to apportion part of its income to states outside Georgia.
The taxpayer in Hawes produced and sold aluminum extrusion
products. All orders for its products were forwarded to its office in
Georgia and were subject to acceptance there by taxpayer. Further,
merchandise was delivered to customers outside Georgia. Taxpayer
maintained corporate sales agencies in Florida and New York, with
the New York office serving taxpayer's eastern sales accounts. In
addition, taxpayer employed sales representatives who operated
from offices in their homes in five different states and a credit manager located outside Georgia who devoted his entire time to credit
and collection work for taxpayer's sales accounts. Finally, taxpayer
76.
77.

Id. at 233, 445 P.2d at 129.
116 Ga. App. 184, 156 S.E.2d 536 (1967).
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shipped inventory to several out-of-state retailers who held the merchandise on consignment until it was sold.
Interpreting the state income apportionment statute, the Court
of Appeals of Georgia held that taxpayer's extra-state activities constituted doing business within the purview of the apportionment
statute and that taxpayer was authorized to apportion its income.
Addressing the state's argument that Public Law 86-272 prevented
apportionment because taxpayer's extra-state operations constituted "solicitation" of orders only, the Georgia court made it clear
that Public Law 86-272 did not in any manner relate to a domestic
corporation of Georgia. The court stated that although attempting
to tax a foreign corporation might now run afoul of the federal
statute (Public Law 86-272), it would not affect the state provision
as to Georgia corporations engaging in the described activities in
other states. In response to the state's argument that it is a bad
policy to allow a corporation an exemption for certain activities that
are no longer taxable in a foreign state because of Public Law 86272, the court tersely replied that if this is true, it is a matter for
the remedial power of the legislature not the courts. The court
added that "[w]hat the legislature might have intended had it
known of the federal statute is a matter of pure speculation and is
better left to the realm of conjecture." 8
The Georgia court in Hawes refused to accede to the state's
argument that Public Law 86-272 prevented apportionment because
taxpayer's extra-state operations were tax exempt as a result of the
federal statute. The court repudiated this argument because, by its
own terms, Public Law 86-272 did not in any manner relate to
taxpayer since it was a domestic corporation of the taxing state.
Thus the Hawes decision represents an important and an intriguing
development. Public Law 86-272 expressly provides that the "solicitation" provision of that statute shall not preclude the imposition
of a net income tax by any state or political subdivision thereof upon
79
any corporation which is incorporated under the laws of that state .
No previous case had taken the position of Hawes. Indeed, neither
1 rejected the state's
Cal-Roof" nor Iron Fireman"
position that a
domestic corporation should not be permitted to apportion its multistate income because the taxpayer was a domestic corporation.
Both courts did reject the state's position, but on the ground that
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 191-92, 156 S.E.2d at 541.
15 U.S.C. § 381(b)(1) (1970).
See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:353

the extra-state activities of the taxpayer constituted more than "solicitation of orders." No expressed significance was attached in either ca~e to the fact that the taxpayer was a domestic corporation.
One of the earliest cases involving Public Law 86-272 was John
Ownbey Co. v. Butler,82 a Tennessee case in which the taxing state
invoked Public Law 86-272. Although the opinion is not very clear,
seemingly the state took the position that all the net income from
the extra-state activity of the taxpayer (a domestic corporation)
should be attributable to the taxing state because the out-of-state
activities producing the income constituted only exempt "solicitation of orders" for the sale of goods under Public Law 86-272. Although not relying entirely on Public Law 86-272, the court did use
this statute to reinforce its decision against the taxpayer.
The Ownbey case involved four domestic corporations that contested the Tennessee corporate excise tax, which was measured by
their entire net income. Gray & Dudley Company, the only taxpayer
examined here, is a manufacturer and seller of appliances that annually sold approximately five percent of its products to customers
within Tennessee, while approximately ninety-five percent of the
total sales were made through solicitation of orders of manufacturers' representatives, with shipment from taxpayer to out-of-state
purchasers. Approximately eight percent of the deliveries in these
states were made through independent warehouses located in Connecticut, New York, Louisiana, and California, where the orders
were solicited. From these warehouses manufacturers' representatives, operating within the same states where the warehouses were
situated, made sales and deliveries directly to the customers, who
were billed from taxpayer's Tennessee office, to which payment was
remitted. Taxpayer likewise made about two percent of its extrastate sales in Louisiana and New York through agents of taxpayer
located in those two states. The goods sold there were shipped to
taxpayer's agents, who upon receipt stored the goods in their warehouses. From their out-of-state warehouse inventory these agents
made sales and deliveries, received all payments for such sales,
maintained books and records, and submitted a monthly inventory
to taxpayer's Tennessee office, accompanied by payments that the
agents had received for the goods.
Contending that about ten percent of its out-of-state activities
exceeded "solicitation of orders" within the purview of Public Law
86-272, thus rendering it subject to taxation in the foreign states,
taxpayer argued that it should be entitled to apportion its taxable
82.

211 Tenn. 366, 365 S.W.2d 33 (1963).
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income to its operations in the foreign states. After discussing the
exemption provisions of Public Law 86-272, the Tennessee court, in
a per curiam opinion of highly doubtful soundness, gave short shrift
to taxpayer's argument that its activities outside Tennessee were
more than "solicitation of orders." After finding that taxpayer
maintained no place of business elsewhere, the court held that taxpayer's total earnings should be apportioned to the taxing state of
Tennessee. Essentially, the court chose not to come to grips with the
question of the tax immune nature of taxpayer's extra-state operations. In its perplexing effort to answer taxpayer's exemption argument, the court stated that:
Gray & Dudley shows that a very small portion of its business is conducted
from out-of-state locations. The portions of the business which might be considered as being done there is so small that it really does not make any difference or show that the apportionment formula should follow. 3

The court's strange use of a de minimis approach to the solicitation question appears unique, to say the least. If, because of taxpayer's extra-state activities, ten percent of its gross sales could be
attributed to extra-state business consisting of more than "solicitation and delivery" of orders, in the view of this writer, these facts
would hardly justify the application of the de minimis doctrine.
Additionally, it is most difficult to believe that the de minimis
doctrine properly has any application whatsoever in this type situation.
Seemingly the Ownbey court virtually recognizes its error in not
permitting taxpayer to apportion when it states:
If it so happened that this very, very small percentage of business that is
claimed to be done is done, and there are certain statutes under which things
done there might be taxed, if they are taxed, it is perfectly easy for Gray &
Dudley [taxpayer] to make this known in making its return and the Commissioner can adjust the matter at the time.8 4

Thus the court would excuse its refusal to permit apportionment
with the statement that if taxpayer (Gray and Dudley) is taxed
elsewhere, "it is perfectly easy for Gray & Dudley to make this
known in making its return and the Commissioner can adjust the
matter at that time."85 The court seems unmindful of an earlier
portion of its opinion in which it declared:
In all four cases the controversy arose out of recomputation by the Commissioner of the respective corporations' excise tax liability for a year or years
83. 211 Tenn. at 381, 365 S.W.2d at 39.
84. Id. at 381-82, 365 S.W.2d at 39.
85. Id. at 382, 365 S.W.2d at 39.
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ending in 1959 or later. In each case the appellant [taxpayer] had filed its
return in due time and had paid the tax shown as the appellant had computed
its return.86

Thus the Commissioner presumably already had all the facts at
hand when he made his decision to deny apportionment, and so did
the Tennessee Supreme Court when it decided the case, as is shown
by the recital in its opinion of facts which fairly clearly indicate
taxpayer's extra-state activities constituted more than solicitation
and delivery of orders. Elsewhere, moreover, net income apportionment by a domestic corporation has been allowed even though the
other states where taxpayer did business imposed no tax on the
business. Sufficient nexus in the other states to support a potential
tax has been enough to warrant apportionment.87
The legislative history of Public Law 86-272 and the statute
itself, in addition to a number of authorities, make it clear that the
use of warehouses and maintenance of inventories in the customer's
state exceed the definition of "solicitation and delivery" of orders
as envisioned by the drafters of Public Law 86-272.11 Public Law 86272 expressly and plainly provides that tax exemption is not given
unless the solicited order is approved outside the state in which the
order was solicited, and the order is filled by "shipment or delivery"
from a point outside the state in which the order was solicited. In
Ownbey, however, "delivery" of some of taxpayer's sales was made
to a customer by taxpayer's representatives from warehouses to
which taxpayer had shipped the goods for storage inside the state
of solicitation. Moreover, taxpayer's representatives received payment for the goods stored in some of the warehouses and remitted
these payments to taxpayer. The various activities described above
hardly can be classified as "solicitation of orders" only; nor do they
readily fall within the category of "delivery" of orders from a point
outside the state in which the order was solicited.
Not only does the Ownbey decision appear contrary to Public
Law 86-272, but the refusal to allow apportionment when such
extra-state contacts are present seemed unsupported by other judicial intepretations of Public Law 86-272 until the Coors specter
reared its grotesque form on the judicial horizon. In 1973 in Coors
Porcelain Co. v. State89 the Colorado Supreme Court was squarely
faced with the Hawes argument that Public Law 86-272 relates only
86. Id. at 371, 365 S.W.2d at 35.
87. Cal-Roof Wholesale, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 242 Ore. 435, 410 P.2d 233
(1966).
88. See notes 96-97 infra and accompanying text.
89. 183 Colo. 325, 517 P.2d 838 (1973).
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to standards applicable to a foreign corporation, and that the statute's correlative use" cannot be a basis for increasing taxable income by the state in which the corporation is domestic, where the
income is generated by multistate and multinational operations.
The taxing state (Colorado) sought to tax all of a Colorado
taxpayer's income from its widespread multinational business on
the ground that taxpayer's extra-state business activities constituted no more than "solicitation of orders" under Public Law 86272. The state reasoned that since taxpayer was exempt from taxation outside Colorado, Colorado had a "green light" to latch onto
taxpayer's total net income from its multinational operations. A
Colorado regulation provides in effect that if under Public Law 86272 a foreign corporation is not doing taxable business in a state
(presumably within the purview of the "solicitation only" provision), then the income attributable to that state is taxable by the
state in which the corporation is domestic, and Coors was a domestic corporation of the taxing state of Colorado. Taxpayer urged, to
the contrary, that the federal statute applies only to foreign corporations and cannot be applied to domestic corporations.
The Coors court agreed with the state that Public Law 86-272
may be used in a correlative manner to determine whether taxpayer's extra-state activities are tax exempt on the ground that
taxpayer was engaged in no more than "solicitation of orders" outside the taxing state of Colorado and hence, Colorado could tax the
entire net income produced by taxpayer's extra-state activities.
After adopting the major premise of the taxing state, the court
turned to the question of whether taxpayer's extra-state operations
did exceed the statutorily prescribed "solicitation of orders" only
exemption. The court's interpretation of "solicitation only" is significant, to say the least, and, in this writer's opinion, exceeds even
the broad interpretation of "solicitation" first announced by the
Oregon court in Smith Kline & French," an interpretation subsequently repudiated by the Oregon judiciary itself in Herff Jones 2
and Cal-Roof, 3 in which "solicitation" was given a much narrower
meaning.
The Coors facts were stipulated. Taxpayer, a domestic corporation of the taxing state of Colorado, manufactures porcelain and
ceramic products, which it distributes in nineteen states and five
90.

See Hawes v. William L. Bonnell Co., 116 Ga. App. 184, 156 S.E.2d 536 (1967),

discussed in text accompanying notes 77-81 supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 46-47 supra.
92. See text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
93. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
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foreign countries. Taxpayer employs approximately ten salaried and
ten commissioned sales agents, who reside and maintain offices outside the taxing state in the states and foreign countries where Coors
products are sold. The Coors court set forth at length the duties and
responsibilities of the Coors field representatives. The court's language is so pertinent to a judgment of the soundness of the decision
of this case that it is quoted at length. The representatives' duties
and responsibilities are described in part as follows:
To solicit sales from present customers and to develop and acquire new customers;. . . To designpartsfor manufacture by Coors which will fit the needs
of a particular customer or potential customer; To be able to intelligently
discuss with customer engineers the problems they are encountering and to
recommend design of Coors products to solve the particularproblem involved;
To be able to present price-quotations to the customer and negotiate such
prices; . . . To discuss with customers any complaints or problems involving
the purchased product; To demonstrate to customers how each Coors product
operates and explain to them why they should purchase the Coors product. . . . Some agents buy directly and resell to their customers. . . . Most
of its manufactured products are custom made as a result of designs submitted
by its field representatives.
Each field representativemaintainshis own business office in the locality
wherein he resides. Coors supplies each field representative with a business
automobile and also places advertisements in the local telephone directory
listing the local representative's business telephone. Coors does not consistently maintain warehouses or stock of products, parts or supplies outside of
Colorado, but its out of state representatives do consistently maintain sample
materials owned by Coors and on occasion they possess Coors products for
shipment to the customer and also retain Coors products which have been
rejected by the customer upon delivery. 4

After examining this enormous mass of out-of-state activity,
the court concluded that "[t]he question may be distilled to an
inquiry of whether or not Coors went beyond the solicitation of
orders in its out-of-state business," and then held that Coors extrastate business did not extend beyond the "solicitation of orders"
only, for the sale of tangible personal property. The only considerations that gave the court any pause on the question whether taxpayer's extra-state activity consisted of more than "solicitation of
orders" was that Coors' out-of-state representatives on occasion possessed products for shipment to customers and also retained Coors
products that had been rejected by the customer on delivery. The
court, however, summarily dismissed the significance of this extrastate activity with the casual observation that it appeared these acts
were not in common practice and were the exception rather than the
rule. It might not be inappropriate to point out, however, that Pub94.

183 Colo. at 327-29, 517 P.2d at 839-40 (emphasis added).
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lic Law 86-272 provides for no "exceptions" to the solicitation only
requirement for the statute to provide an exemption from taxation.
The Coors court, seemingly inflicted with judicial tunnel vision,
disregarded the fact that taxpayer's agents maintain offices outside
the taxing state and in states and foreign countries where Coors
products are marketed. The virtually unanimous view, including
the legislative history, on the scope of Public Law 86-272 squarely
is that such operations would forfeit the tax exemption." This point
is solidly nailed down by the Senate hearings that led to the passage
of Public Law 86-272, which make it clear that the drafters did not
intend to include sales offices, ownership of warehouses, and storage
of inventory within the definition of "solicitation" for purposes of
the Public Law 86-272 exemption." Also, Senator Harry F. Byrd, a
member of the Senate Committee responsible for the bill, stated in
the Congressional Record that: "[the statute] does not prohibit
taxation if the company has a warehouse in the state or other physi
cal facilities . . . for the purpose of implementing the sale of the
goods." 9"
A question unanswered by the Coors court is whether the fact
that some agents buy directly from taxpayer and resell to their
customers does not also eliminate the out-of-state seller from the
protection of Public Law 86-272 on the ground that the seller was
not making the statutorily required deliveries from a point outside
the state. 8 Likewise, other courts have regarded the instruction and
demonstration to customers of the use of the seller's product as a
factor that may forfeit the "solicitation and delivery" tax exemption." Perhaps it would not be amiss to recall here that the pertinent
part of Public Law 86-272 provides that the taxing power of state
and local governments is congressionally ousted by Public Law 86272 "if the only business activities within such State by or on behalf
of such person [seller]" consists of "the solicitation of orders by
95. See Part II A supra.
96. S. REP. No. 658, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1959).
97. 105 CONG. REC. 16,355 (1959).
98. Interestingly, in Coors no claim was made that taxpayer was exempt from taxation
because Coors representatives were "independent contractors," affording protection from
taxation on that ground. See notes 4-5 supra and accompanying text.
In Tonka Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxation, 284 Minn. 185, 169 N.W.2d 589 (1969), the
taxing state (Minnesota) invoked Public Law 86-272. The state claimed that taxpayer was
doing business in other states through "independent contractors"; hence taxpayer could not
be taxable in the other state by reason of Public Law 86-272. Consequently, argued the taxing
state, it could tax the total amount of taxpayer's multistate income. The court held, however,
that taxpayer was not operating through "independent contractors" in the other state, but
through representatives only. Thus taxpayer was permitted to apportion its income.
99. See text accompanying notes 52 & 64 supra.
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such person, or his representative ... for sales of tangible personal
property, which orders are sent outside the State for approval or
rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from
a point outside the State [where the order was solicited]." 1
When all of the extra-state business activities of Coors are considered in light of the holdings and rationale of earlier cases,'0 ' it is
inconceivable to this writer how it rationally can be concluded that
taxpayer was "only engaged in the solicitation of orders" outside the
taxing state of Colorado, within the purview of Public Law 86-272.
Of course, it meant dollars and cents in the coffers of the taxing
state to have its own court treat taxpayer's extra-state business
activities as no more than solicitation of orders by representatives
of taxpayer in all the states other than Colorado and foreign countries in which taxpayer carried on these activities.102 Thus Colorado
could sink its tax talons into all the net income earned by taxpayer
in this far-flung, multinational operation.
If the Coors flood-tide interpretation of "solicitation of orders
only" is followed, it is doubtful whether the high-water mark of taxexemption could be judicially pushed much higher without inundating a necessary tax base. That unfortunate result would be especially applicable when the out-of-state seller invokes Public Law 86272, contends that its activities within the taxing state do not exceed "solicitation of orders," and thus claims immunity from the
net income tax. That invocation appears from the statute to be its
only proper use and has been the area where perhaps most of the
cases have arisen. If Colorado were faced with that question it would
be interesting to speculate whether the Colorado judiciary might not
use an accordion definition of "soliciation of orders only," so that it
could be expanded and contracted to suit its ends. Additionally, the
taxing state may invoke Public Law 86-272 and contend that taxpayer's extra-state activities consist only of solicitation and delivery
and are exempt from taxation on its extra-state activities, thus
100. 15 U.S.C. § 381(a)(1) (1970) (emphasis added); see text accompanying notes 2-3
supra.
101. See Part I A supra.
102. It might plausibly be questioned whether Public Law 86-272 has any application
at all to the five foreign countries in which taxpayer did business, since the federal statute
only refers to activity among "States." At no place in Public Law 86-272 is "State" defined
to include foreign countries. Also, the United States Government has tax treaties with 3 of
the foreign countries involved (France, Netherlands, and Canada). There is no mention
whatsoever in the Coors opinion whether these tax treaties might apply to the taxability of
the income derived from these foreign countries. There is no need to cite authority for the
proposition that a treaty made by the United States Government, if in conflict with the laws
of Colorado (the taxing state), would be paramount.
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leaving the income generated by the entire multistate business subject to taxation not only by the state in which a corporationmay
be incorporated, but also, presumably, by the state in which an
individual is domiciled or of which he is a resident.
Unfortunately for the taxpayer in the Coors case-and for
taxpayers similarly situated-the Colorado court's decision that
taxpayer was engaged in the exempt solicitation of orders only is not
binding on the courts of the other nineteen states and five foreign
countries where Coors conducts its business. Hence, for all that
Public Law 86-272 has to say, taxpayer may be subjected to taxation
in some or all of these jurisdictions, as well as taxation on all of its
net income in Colorado. Subjecting interstate business to such a
cumulative tax burden, to which local business is not exposed, is
multiple taxation of the rankest sort and gives local business a
competitive advantage over multistate operations. Although the
interstate taxpayer may resort to the commerce clause of the United
States Constitution for protection, the cases make it clear that the
taxpayer will have difficulty upsetting a tax on the ground that he
is subjected to cumulative tax burdens not borne by local business.103

II.

THE IMPACT OF THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED

STATES CONSTITUTION ON THE SOLICITATION AND DELIVERY PROVISIONS

OF PUBLIC LAW

86-272

The case of Heublein, Inc. v. South CarolinaTax Commission,4
called into question the relationship between the solicitation and
delivery provisions of Public Law 86-272 and the twenty-first
amendment of the United States Constitution. The twenty-first
amendment, section 2, provides, in part, that "[t]he transportation or importation into any State . . .for delivery or use therein
of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby
prohibited."'' 5 The breadth of this amendment is clarified in
Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.:
This Court made clear in the early years following adoption of the Twenty-first
Amendment that by virtue of its provisions a State is totally unconfined by
traditional Commerce Clause limitations when it restricts the importation of
intoxicants destined for use, distribution, or consumption within its borders. 0'
103. Corrigan, Interstate CorporateIncome Taxation-Recent Revolutions and a Modern Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423, 424; Dexter, Taxation of Income from Intangibles of
Multistate-MultinationalCorporations,29 VAND. L. REV. 401, 402; Hellerstein, State Taxation and the Commerce Clause: An HistoricalPerspective, 29 VAND. L. REV. 335 (1976).
104. 409 U.S. 275 (1972).
105. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
106. 377 U.S. 324, 330 (1964).
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Incident to South Carolina's long and detailed scheme of regulating the sale of liquor within the state, the manufacturer of alcoholic beverages was required, among other things, to send its products to its local representative in the state, who transferred them to
a local wholesaler. This transfer occurred within the state and, as
the United States Supreme Court concluded, clearly was neither
"'solicitation' nor the filling of orders [for liquor] 'by shipment or
delivery from a point outside the State,'" within the scope of the
exemption of Public Law 86-272.117 South Carolina (the taxing state)
levied its income tax on the income from the local sales of taxpayer's
products. Heublein, a foreign -corporation that produces alcoholic
beverages for sale in South Carolina, attacked the validity of the tax
on the ground that the taxing state's requirements for the sale of
liquor in that state could not deny it the protection of Public Law
86-272. In support of its position taxpayer argued that the taxing
state could not evade the purpose of Public Law 86-272 by requiring
taxpayer to do more than solicit business within the state, and then
taxing it for engaging in this compelled additional activity.
The United States Supreme Court, affirming the South Carolina Supreme Court's denial of an exemption under Public Law 86272, answered taxpayer by declaring that South Carolina's system
of regulating the sale of liquor is valid under the twenty-first amendment, that South Carolina was pursuing constitutionally permissible ends, and that since her system of regulating the sale of liquor
is valid, Public Law 86-272 does not prohibit taxation of taxpayer's
local sales. In short, incident to the taxing state's valid scheme of
regulating the sale of liquor within its boundaries, the Court concluded that a requirement that the taxpayer-manufacturer (Heublein) do more than merely solicit sales as a condition of doing
business is not impermissible. This state regulation is permissible
although it has the effect of requiring the extra-state taxpayer to
undertake activities that eliminate it from the protection of the
"solicitation" and "delivery" provisions of Public Law 86-272 with
respect to the state's income tax. Thus, within the limited scope of
the twenty-first amendment, a state can affirmatively deny an outof-state manufacturer the protection of Public Law 86-272.
IV. SUMMARY COMMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
Forty-six states, plus the District of Columbia, have corporate
net income taxes of some variety.108 Thus, the problem of the impact
107.

108.

409 U.S. at 278-79.
1 P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT

101.
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of Public Law 86-272 is of substantial importance. Between the tax
immunity of Public Law 86-272 for net income taxes flowing from
mere "solicitation" and "delivery" of orders for the interstate sale
of tangible personal property and the tax consequences attaching to
an intrastate business operation, lies a vast realm of doubt and
ambiguity with regard to much of the activity involved in the distribution of goods.
Regarding "solicitation" Public Law 86-272 expressly states
that no state or local government has power to impose a net income
tax on income derived within the state from interstate commerce by
any person if the only business activity within the taxing state by
or on behalf of that person is the solicitation of customers, or the
solicitation of orders for the benefit of a prospective customer of the
business. To engage in this interstate activity without tax consequences, the out-of-state seller or his representative who solicits the
order is further limited to solicitation of orders for the sale of tangible personal property that are accepted out of state and filled by
"shipment or delivery from a point outside the state" from which
the order was solicited.
In light of the enormous variety of activities conducted by interstate business, the status of the state decisional law under Public
Law 86-272 today leaves a broad spectrum of commercial activity
within an area of doubt on the question whether the activity of the
taxpayer eliminates that person from the net income tax protection
of the "solicitation" and "delivery" provisions of Public Law 86-272
as applied to interstate business. While Public Law 86-272 expressly
answers the question of tax liability in some instances, a very considerable area remains in which the taxpayer and the tax administrator are left with only their respective arguments to pursue, rather
than well-established tax guidelines to follow. Thus, regarding a
wide range of commercial activities, the combined effect of state
laws and Public Law 86-272 falls far short of providing a definitive
answer to the question of tax consequences flowing from the particular transaction.
After exploring the labyrinth of the intricate, differing facts of
the cases construing the "solicitation" and "delivery" exemption of
Public Law 86-272, it appears practically impossible to distill from
these cases a precise, uniform, predictively trustworthy interpretation of the scope of that exemption. This inability to formulate
uniform, dependable guidelines is attributable to a number of considerations. In the first place, there have been relatively few cases
in which the courts have interpreted the solicitation and delivery
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provisions of Public Law 86-272. Moreover, the high court of each
of the fifty states has autonomy to reach its own decision in this
matter, since the United States Supreme Court has not given an
authoritative interpretation of these provisions. Hence, conflicting
decisions among the state courts are to be expected. A complicating
circumstance that adds to the difficulty of distilling uniform guidelines from the decisions is the fact that each case in which the
taxpayer has been denied the protection of the solicitation and delivery provisions of the federal statute has dealt with a number of
activities, which have been used by the court in toto to deny exemption. Thus it is very difficult to single out any one activity as the
determinative consideration in the court's denial of the exemption.
Neither Congress nor the United States Supreme Court has
taken steps during the more than sixteen years in which Public Law
86-272 has been in effect to clear up the briar patch of this "stopgap" legislation; hence each of the fifty states is free to place its own
construction on the solicitation and delivery provisions. It comes as
no great surprise, therefore, that different courts have reached differing conclusions concerning the tax-insulating effect of solicitation
and delivery of orders, on identical or highly similar operative facts
of a case. Even the same jurisdiction has had a change of heart on
the exemptive scope of such activities." 9
Many perplexing and knotty problems remain unsolved. There
is doubt whether a seller comes within the protection of "solicitation
of orders" only in a state where the seller rents a display room.
Activities engaged in by the seller in obtaining the original order
may have helped secure the order, as well as repeat business. Thus,
to what extent may the seller aid a customer in the installation of
newly purchased equipment without jeopardizing his otherwise tax
immune status? While Public Law 86-272 makes it clear that delivery of goods into a state does not deprive the selling company of tax
immunity, nevertheless questions can arise regarding the meaning
of "delivery." For example, does the term "delivery" include
installation work-a term broad enough to encompass both jobs
requiring five minutes and those requiring five weeks?1 0 Has a seller
done more than deliver its tangible personal property into the customer's state if the seller retains a security interest in the goods
sold? Is the seller eliminated from the protection of Public Law 86272 if in responding to a warranty obligation it services the delivered
products on the customer's premises?'
109.
110.
111.

See text accompanying notes 42-51 supra.
See 1 WILLIS SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 146.
Id.
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Further, does the residency of the taxpayer's representative in
the state in which he solicits alone constitute activity that will
eliminate taxpayer from the solicitation exemption of Public Law
86-272? There is authority to the effect that the representatives'
residency alone does not destroy the exemption."' In a similar vein,
does the fact that a taxpayer, a foreign corporation, has qualified
to do business in a taxing state constitute enough connection with
the taxing state so that the qualification alone will eliminate it from
the solicitation provisions of Public Law 86-272? One case, CIBA,
has answered the question in the negative. Tax immunity was
granted.".' These are but a few of the imponderables that remain
under the solicitation and delivery provisions of Public Law 86-272.
The Special Subcommittee on State Taxation of Interstate
Commerce, which conducted a study of state and local taxation of
interstate commerce lasting over four years pursuant to Public Law
86-272, as amended,"' compiled lists of what it regarded as "protected activities" and "unprotected or taxable activities," under
Public Law 86-272. This classification was based upon results derived from the Subcommittee's method of conducting the study.
While the Subcommittee's opinion is in no respect conclusive on
what constitutes solicitation or delivery, nevertheless, in light of the
combined expertise and extensive in-depth investigative experience
of these members, their opinions should be persuasive and useful.
To use the Subcommittee's introduction, the "following lists
indicate the activities treated as protected by Public Law 86-272
and those treated as not protected and therefore taxable. To be
treated as protected by the statute in a state for purposes of the
analysis in this section, a company has to be incorporated outside
the State and have in the State one or more of the activities on the
first list but none of the activities on the second list. ' 114
Protected Activities
Usual or frequent activity in the State by employees soliciting orders
without authority to accept them.
Usual or frequent activity in the State by employees displaying goods or
engaged in other promotional activity, but not soliciting or taking orders.
112. See, e.g., State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382
S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.Further authority
is found in the hearings that resulted in Public Law 86-272. See 105 CONG. REC. 16,354-55
(1959).
112.1. CIBA Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 382 S.W.2d 645
(Mo. 1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
113. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
114.

1 WILLIS SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 426.
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Unprotected or Taxable Activities
Maintenance of any business location in the State, including any kind of
office.
Ownership of real property in the State.
Ownership of a stock of goods in a public warehouse.
Usual or frequent activity in the State by employees soliciting orders with
authority to accept them.
Usual or frequent activity in the State by employees engaged in purchasing activity or in the performance of services (including installation, assembly,
and repair of equipment).
Operation of mobile stores in the State (such as trucks with driver salesmen), regardless of frequency."'

The Subcommittee made it clear that it did not regard these two
lists as exhaustive of all pertinent activities having tax consequences that might be conducted within a state."8
Subsequent to this Subcommittee analysis of Public Law 86272, a number of cases have dealt with taxpayer activities that the
Subcommittee includes on the "Protected Activities" or the "Unprotected or Taxable Activities" lists. There have been a few rather
radical departures from what might be termed the Subcommittee's
prognostications of taxable activities." 7 On the other hand, several
cases have taken positions suggested by the Subcommittee's Report. As the Subcommittee predicted, for example, servicing and
repair-usually coupled with other activities-have been used by
the courts as activities that will bar the taxpayer from the haven of
the Public Law 86-272 exemption.1 18 Also as suggested, investigation
of customer complaints has been one of the activities, when included along with others, that has caused the court to find tax
liability."19

An activity that has provoked disagreement on whether it falls
within the solicitation exemption of Public Law 86-272 is the extent
to which the out-of-state seller may go in training or instructing
prospective customers in the use of the seller's product. CIBA'20 and
Coors,'2' on the one hand, and Clairol, 22 on the other, represent
115. Id. at 427.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., Coors Porcelain Co. v. State, 183 Colo. 325, 517 P.2d 838 (1973), discussed
in text accompanying notes 89-103 supra, a case that characterized as mere solicitations a
number of activities which had been predicted to be more than solicitations.
118. See, e.g., Iron Fireman Mfg. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 251 Ore. 227, 445 P.2d 126
(1968), discussed in text accompanying notes 74-76 supra.
119. See, e.g., Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Commissioner, 3 Ore. Tax Rep. 174 (1968),
discussed in text accompanying notes 52-53 supra.
120. State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 382 S.W.2d
645 (Mo. 1964), discussed in text accompanying notes 56-63 supra.
121. Coors Porcelain Co. v. State, 183 Colo. 325, 517 P.2d 838 (1973), discussed in text
accompanying notes 89-103 supra.
122. Clairol, Inc. v. Kingsley, 109 N.J. Super. 22, 262 A.2d 213 (App. Div. 1970), discussed in text accompanying notes 64-67 supra.
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sharply separable views on this point. In CIBA and Coors the pertinent activity was to familiarize prospective users with the product,
presumably in part for the purpose of inducing sales. In CIBA no
tax liability attached. In Coors such activity, along with other operations, was held not to exceed solicitation of orders. The Oregon case
of Smith Kline & French,123 the rationale of which was limited by
Herff Jones1 2 and Cal-Roof,' 25 treated the instruction of prospective
customers in the use of the product as an essential ingredient of
solicitation, and granted taxpayer an exemption. In the later case
1 2
of Briggs & Stratton,
however, the Oregon court, in denying the
immunity under Public Law 86-272, emphasized that the seller's
representative did more than solicit orders in giving technical engineering advice to customers as well as conducting training schools
and lectures on proper service techniques.
To help secure an order or obtain repeat business, it may be
customary for a salesman to help his customers check their inventory as an adjunct to the solicitation of orders. Nevertheless, courts
have given weight to the salesman's participation in the inventorytaking process alone, or along with other factors, in determining
that the salesman's activities encompassed more than the solicitation of orders, and thus denying the taxpayer an exemption under
Public Law 86-272.127
The situation under the solicitation exemption of Public Law
86-272 is further complicated and exacerbated by the fact that some
taxing states, without any express congressional authority, have
treated this statute as more than strictly a minimal nexus statute
for tax purposes. Instead, they in essence have converted this federal
statute into an apportionment statute.' 2 That is, some taxing states
have invoked the provisions regarding solicitation and delivery of
orders to decide whether the extra-state business of taxpayer exceeds those nontaxability tests, so as to include the income gener123. Smith Kline & French Laboratories v. State Tax Comm'n, 241 Ore. 50, 403 P.2d
375 (1965), discussed in text accompanying notes 42-47 supra.
124. Herff Jones Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 247 Ore. 404, 430 P.2d 998 (1967), discussed
in text accompanying notes 48-51 supra.
125. Cal-Roof Wholesale Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Ore. 435, 410 P.2d 233 (1966),
discussed in text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 52-53.
127. See Harvey v. AMF Beaird, Inc., 250 Ark. 147, 464 S.W.2d 557 (1971), discussed
in text accompanying note 68 supra. But see State ex rel. CIBA Pharmaceutical Prod., Inc.,
382 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1964).
128. See Part I A (2) supra.
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ated by the extra-state business of the taxpayer in its taxable income in the taxing state. Seemingly, Public Law 86-272 was intended by Congress to be only a nexus statute and thus, only to
prohibit the taxing state from levying a tax on a foreign seller when
taxpayer's business activity within the taxing state does not exceed
a certain minimal standard. Neither the statutory language nor the
legislative history seem reasonably to afford the state a means of
widening its tax collection by holding that the taxpayer in a multistate operation, because of Public Law 86-272, is not taxable in
another state, thus enabling the forum state to reach income generated in the other state. It seems to this writer that if a correct
interpretation of this federal statute, as the statute appears on its
face to read, is to consider it only a minimal nexus statute for the
taxing state, then this statute should properly have no bearing on
whether the selling taxpayer had income from extra-state activities
that did or did not exceed this specific, congressionally prescribed
prohibition against taxation of income.'29
When the solicitation and delivery provisions of Public Law 86272 have been invoked by the state for the purposes of determining
the tax base of a business with respect to its extra-state operations,
some courts have been even-handed in their interpretation of what
activities transcend solicitation and delivery or orders. Other courts,
unbridled by controlling authority, however, have tortured the concepts of solicitation and delivery out of all reasonable proportion, so
as to find that the extra-state business did not exceed the permissible bounds of tax immunity. ' In this self-serving manner a taxgrasping court can substantially increase the tax intake of its own
state from multistate business by including the income from the
out-of-state business within the reach of the taxing statute of the
forum state. This doctrine of invocation by the state to reach income
generated out of state seems to have been employed thus far only
when a domestic corporation is the taxpayer. If the doctrine can be
applied to domestic corporations,however, it logically should apply
to individuals domiciled in or residing in the taxing state. Yet,
Public Law 86-272 plainly provides that domestic corporations or
individuals domiciled in or residing in the state of solicitationdo not
129. See Barnes, State Taxation of InterstateCommerce: Chaos and New Hope, 16 W.
RES. L. REv. 859, 876 (1965). Some authority has flatly repudiated this use of Public Law 86272. See Hawes v. William L. Bonnell Co., 116 Ga. App. 184, 156 S.E.2d 536 (1967) discussed
in text accompanying notes 77-79 supra.
130. See Coors Porcelain Co. v. State, 183 Colo. 325, 517 P.2d 838 (1973), discussed in
text accompanying notes 89-103 supra; John Ownbey Co. v. Butler, 211 Tenn. 366, 365
S.W.2d 33 (1963), discussed in text accompanying notes 82-87 supra.
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come within the provisions of this federal statute.'3 '
The use of Public Law 86-272 by the taxing state to determine
whether income from extra-state activities is exempt from taxation
by this statute at first examination might seem to inject into the
state tax equation an additional factor concerning the "choice of
law" in the field of conflict of laws. When the taxing state purports
to make a definitive finding on whether the extra-state activities
producing the income exceed the compass of "solicitation" and
"delivery" for the purpose of determining the amount of taxable net
income, the cases seem to pretermit the question of what state's
laws should govern for the purpose of characterizing the extra-state
activity as more than solicitation or delivery of orders. Thus far, the
forum state ostensibly has applied its own substantive law in making that characterization. The state in which the activity occurs,
however, clearly seems to have the most "contacts" in the matter,
which now seems to be the sine qua non for resolving choice of law
problems. Since a federal statute is being interpreted, however, the
state rules governing the choice of law should have no application
here. Thus, seemingly the forum state properly could use its own
interpretation of the federal statute to define solicitation or delivery
of orders in another state, until an authoritative interpretation of
Public Law 86-272 is handed down by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
Moreover, the correlative use of Public Law 86-272 by a state
to determine taxability of income from extra-state activities is not
binding on any other state. Hence, for all that Public Law 86-272
has to contribute, a taxpayer may find itself subject to a tax in both
states if the taxing state concludes that it can reach income from
the extra-state activities. On the other hand, it is conceivable (but
not as likely) that the taxpayer may escape a tax on its income if
both states agree that taxpayer is engaged only in tax-exempt solicitation and delivery of orders for goods. 3 '
With these and other problems in mind, the Special Subcommittee that conducted the study authorized under Title II of Public
Law 86-272, as amended, 33 recommended sweeping congressional
changes in the field of state and local taxation. The recommendations included the adoption of a two-factor formula (using property
131.

15 U.S.C. § 381(b) (1970).

132. For a discussion of this "nowhere income," see Corrigan, Interstate Corporate
Income Taxation-Recent Revolutions and a Modern Response, 29 VAND. L. REV. 423, 429
(1976).

133. Act of April 7, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-17, 75 Stat. 41, amending Pub. L. No. 86-272,
tit. II, 73 Stat. 555.
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and payroll) to be employed to apportion net income among the
states in which a multistate business operates.' Some of the early
bills introduced in Congress as a result of this study not only contained similar far-reaching changes, but also included the twofactor apportionment formula. In addition, many of these bills, pursuant to the Subcommittee's recommendations, contained Public
Law 86-272 as an integral part of the bills. 3 '
This type of pervasive action in the field of interstate commerce
drew violent opposition from the tax administrators and others of
like thinking. Further, they insisted, among other things, that the
formula for apportionment of net income should be a three-factor
formula, consisting of property, payroll, and sales, with the sales
factor being assigned to the state of destination of the sold goods.
As a counterproposal to the Subcommittee's recommendations
and the interstate taxation bills introduced in Congress, the Council
of State Governments proposed a Multistate Tax Compact, which
would be adopted by the states, with the approval of Congress.'36
Under this Compact the states would voluntarily agree on uniform
regulations to ease the tax burdens on multistate business. The
Compact was drafted by the Council of State Governments with the
cooperation of the National Association of Tax Administrators, the
National Association of Attorneys General, and the National Legislative Conference, under the auspices of the Council of State Governments."'
134.

4

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL SUBCOMM. ON STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE

OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1145-50
(1965).
135. See H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965); S.1245, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973);
S. 2092, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
136. There is some question whether congressional approval is necessary here. The
compact clause of the United States Constitution provides that no state shall, without the
consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another state or with a foreign
power. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10. For the background, development, and present status of the
interstate compact, see R. LEACH & R. SuGos, THE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS
(1959); V. THURSBY, INTERSTATE CORPORATION (Public Affairs Press 1953); F. ZIMMERMAN & M.
WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925 (1951); Celler, Congress, Compacts, andInterstate Authorities, 26 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 682 (1961); Dunbar, Interstate Compacts and
Congressional Consent, 36 VA. L. REV. 753 (1950); Engdahl, Characterizationof Interstate
Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a Compact? 64 MICH L. REV. 63 (1965); Frankfurter
& Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in InterstateAdjustments, 34
YALE L.J. 685 (1925); Grad, Federal-State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-operative
Federalism, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 825 (1963); Weinfeld, What Did the Framersof the Constitution Mean By "Agreements or Compacts?", 3 U. CMI. L. REV. 453 (1936); Note, The Constitutionality of the Multistate Tax Compact, 29 VAND. L. REV. 453 (1976).
137. See P-H STATE & LOCAL TAXES, ALL STATES UNIT 5100. Twenty-one states have
adopted the Compact as regular members, and 15 are associate members. Id.
5150, 5151.
See Corrigan, supra note 130 at n.44.
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The Compact was designed to facilitate proper determination
of state and local tax liability of interstate business, equitable apportionment of tax bases among the states, and convenience in all
phases of state and local tax administration. To simplify taxpayer
compliance and eliminate the possibility of double net income taxation, the taxpayer is given the option of paying taxes under the state
and local laws in effect, or apportioning and allocating income
under the provisions of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax
Purposes Act (UDITPA), which provides a three-factor apportion38
ment formula using property, payroll and sales factors.
The Multistate Tax Compact apportionment formula would
not conflict with Public Law 86-272, but under the supremacy
clause, none of the Compact's provisions that do conflict with Public Law 86-272 could be sustained unless Congress expressly so provided. The Multistate Tax Compact cannot resolve all the pressing
problems involved in state and local taxation of interstate business.
It is just conceivable, however, that the Compact may satisfactorily
handle enough of these problems, so that Congress may not be
overly anxious to enact a broad pattern of legislation that pervades
the whole area of state taxation of multistate business.
In any event, it is clear that the failure of Public Law 86-272 to
provide guidelines for what constitutes "solicitation" and "delivery" has created uncertainty over the law's applicability among
taxpayers, tax administrators, and the courts, as evidenced by the
conflicting judicial interpretations among the state courts. Congress
thus has opened up a Pandora's Box of troubles. As has been suggested, it has created a real risk of double taxation. Additionally,
confusion regarding tax liability under this statute has caused many
' A clarification of
marginal taxpayers to file no returns at all. 39
these
areas of "solicitation" of orders and "delivery" of goods most emphatically is needed.
A decision, or perhaps a series of decisions, by the Supreme
Court of the United States could help to remove this tapestry of
confusion and might furnish some helpful guidance in the matter.
Thus far the Supreme Court has refused to give this direction;
instead, it has declined to consider a number of state court decisions
that it was asked to review. While judicial guidance would help, it
has been widely recognized, especially by the United States Supreme Court, that the legislative branch of government is better
suited to formulate policies founded upon economic realities regard138.
139.

Id. 5105.
1 WILLIS SUBCOMMIrrEE REPORT 597.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:353

ing taxation of interstate commerce than are the courts. 0 The accommodation of the states' right to tax and the national interest in
unobstructed commerce is a delicate matter, requiring the research
and statistical resources that only Congress can provide. The courts,
on the other hand, must decide each case on an unsatisfactory piecemeal basis."'
Congress should afford some statutory help by giving guidance
regarding these ambiguous terms so as to eliminate the uncertainty,
confusion, and disparity of interpretation that now exists under
Public Law 86-272. To promote maximum effectiveness, this congressional guidance should be coupled with a realistic and acceptable uniform income apportionment formula that would eliminate,
as far as possible, multiple taxation of interstate business. This
would go a long way in promoting fair and predictable state tax
treatment for multistate and multinational businesses.
140. See Hartman, State Taxation of InterstateCommerce: A Survey and an Appraisal,
46 VA. L. REv. 1051, 1118-20 (1960).
141. See 1 Wiu~s SuBcommrr= REPORT 11-14.
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APPENDIX
PUBLIC LAW 86-272
§ 381. Imposition of net income tax.
(a)

Minimum standards.

No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to
impose, for any taxable year ending after September 14, 1959, a net
income tax on the income derived within such State by any person
from interstate commerce if the only business activities within such
State by or on behalf of such person during such taxable year are
either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State for sales of tangible personal property,
which orders are sent outside the State for approval or rejection,
and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery from a point
outside the State; and
(2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in the name of or for the benefit of a
prospective customer of such person, if orders by such customer
to such person to enable such customer to fill orders resulting
from such solicitation are orders described in paragraph (1).
(b) Domestic corporations; persons domiciled in or residents of a
State.
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not apply
to the imposition of a net income tax by any State, or political
subdivision thereof, with respect to(1) any corporation which is incorporated under the laws of
such State; or
(2) any individual who, under the laws of such State, is
domiciled in, or a resident of, such State.
(c) Sales or solicitation of orders for sales by independent contractors.
For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person shall not be
considered to have engaged in business activities within a State
during any taxable year merely by reason of sales in such State, or
the solicitation of orders for sales in such State, of tangible personal
property on behalf of such person by one or more independent contractors, or by reason of the maintenance of an office in such State
by one or more independent contractors whose activities on behalf
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of such person in such State consist solely of making sales, or soliciting orders for sales, o[f] tangible personal property.
(d)

Definitions.

For purposes of this section(1) the term "independent contractor" means a commission agent, broker, or other independent contractor who is engaged in selling, or soliciting orders for the sale of, tangible personal property for more than one principal and who holds himself out as such in the regular course of his business activities;
and
(2) the term "representative" does not include an independent contractor.
§ 382. Assessment of net income taxes; limitations; collection.
(a) No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power
to assess, after September 14, 1959, any net income tax which was
imposed by such State or political subdivision, as the case may be,
for any taxable year ending on or before such date, on the income
derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce,
if the imposition of such tax for a taxable year ending after such
date is prohibited by section 381 of this title.
(b) the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall not be
construed(1) to invalidate the collection, on or before September 14,
1959, of any net income tax imposed for a taxable year ending
on or before such date, or
(2) to prohibit the collection, after September 14, 1959, of
any net income tax which was assessed on or before such date
for a taxable year ending on or before such date.
§ 383. Definition.
For purpose of this chapter, the term "net income tax" means
any tax imposed on, or measured by, net income.
§ 384. Separability of provisions.
If any provision of this chapter or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of
this chapter or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than those to which it is held invalid, shall not
be affected thereby.

